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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Standard of Review for Findings of Fact.

Throughout Respondent's Brief, reference is made to the case
of Bennion v. Hansen, 699 P.2d 757 (Utah 1985), in support
of an incorrect standard of review by the Appellate Court
with respect to the trial court's findings of fact.

The

correct standard of review has been enunciated by the Utah
Supreme Court in its subsequent decisions of State of Utah
v. Bryan Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987), and Western Kane

County Special Service District No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle
Company, 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987).

Pursuant to these more

recent decisions, if the trial court's findings of fact are
against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the
appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made, the findings shall
be set aside on appeal.
2.
Law.

Standard of Review With Respect to Conclusions of

While findings of fact will not be set aside

ordinarily unless they are clearly erroneous, conclusions of
law are simply reviewable on appeal for their correctness,
without any special deference.
3.
of Law.

The Trial Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions
In this case, both the trial court's findings of

fact and conclusions of law are clearly erroneous, and upon
application of the correct standard of review on appeal,
require reversal herein.
ARGUMENT
I
RESPONDENT INCORRECTLY DEFINES THE
STANDARD OF REVIEW REQUIRED BY UTAH
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR FINDINGS OF
FACT BY THE TRIAL JUDGE.
At pages 16 and 17 of Respondent's Brief, Respondent
argues that the universally recognized and established rule
in this state, pursuant to Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and Bennion v. Hansen, supra, is that "findings of
the trial court will not be disturbed unless there is no
-2-

record of evidence to support them, viewed in a light most
favorable to the trial court's ruling."

However, effective

January 1, 1987, a new Rule 52(a) became effective in this
state, and in its 1987 decisions of State of Utah v. Bryan
Walker, supra, and Western Kane County Special Service
District No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Company, supra, the Utah
Supreme Court clearly specified the interpretation and
application of Rule 52(a), specifically noting in Walker
that:
We disavow language in our earlier cases
describing or implying a standard under
new Rule 52(a) which differs in any
significant respect from the standard of
review applied in this case.
Noting that the language of Rule 52(a) is similar to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and that federal case law
has defined the standard of review under the Federal Rule,
the Utah Supreme Court in Walker cited a prominent federal
authority as summarizing that standard as follows:
It is not accurate to say that the
appellate court takes that view of the
evidence that is most favorable to the
appellee, that it assumes that all
conflicts in the evidence were resolved
in his favor, and that he must be given
the benefit of all favorable inferences.
All of this is true in reviewing a jury
verdict. It is not true when it is
findings of the court that are being
reviewed. Instead, the appellate court
may examine all of the evidence in the
record. It will presume that the trial
court relied only on evidence properly
admissible in making its finding in the
absence of a clear showing to the
contrary. It must give great weight to
the findings made and the inferences
-3-

drawn by the trial judge, but it must
reject his findings if it considers them
to be clearly erroneous. Wright &
Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure,
page 2585 (1971).
The Utah Supreme Court then continues in Walker by
citing the case of United States v. United States Gypsum
Company, 333 *U.S. 364, 395 (1948), as defining the term
"clearly erroneous" to mean:
A finding is "clearly erroneous" when,
although there is evidence to support
it, the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.
The Utah Supreme Court concludes in Walker that the content
of the Utah Rule 52(a) "clearly erroneous" standard,
imported from the Federal Rule, requires that if the
findings are against the clear weight of the evidence, or if
the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made, the findings will
be set aside.

Similarly, under similar rules, courts in

other jurisdictions have also concluded that the finding of
the trial court is not necessarily binding upon an appellate
court when it clearly appears from the whole record that
such finding is wrong; and, that the power of a court of
review ought not to be left paralyzed, so as to prevent a
miscarriage of justice merely by the erroneous findings of
the trial court.

Thuringer v. Trafton, 58 Colo. 250, 144 P.

866; Ortega v. Koury, 55 N.M. 142, 227 P.2d 941.
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Notwithstanding the trial court's findings of fact, if
the evidence clearly preponderates in the other direction,
the appellate court should substitute its judgment for that
of a trial judge sitting without a jury.

In this case, the

appellate court should review the record as a whole, and as
set forth and referred to in Appellant's Brief, to see that,
in fact, the preponderance of the evidence clearly shows
that ther^ was essentially no dispute over the original
contract price for the framing subcontract, or the amount
remaining unpaid thereon, and the only real dispute was over
extra work agreed to directly between the owners and
subcontractors in light of the claimed offsets by the owners
against the subcontractors, where the trial court
specifically found the subcontract to have been
substantially completed.
II
TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE
REVIEWABLE FOR CORRECTNESS, WITHOUT ANY
SPECIAL DEFERENCE.
In o^rder to correctly apply the standard of review by
the appellate court, a distinction must be made between its
review of the findings of fact by the trial court, and its
review of the trial court's conclusions of law.

Citing its

earlier decision in State v. Walker, supra, with approval,
the Utah Supreme Court explained this distinction in its
decision in Western Kane County Special Service District

-5-

No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Company, supra, (Utah 1987), by
indicating:
While findings of fact will not be set
aside unless they are clearly erroneous,
conclusions of law are simply reviewable
for correctness without any special
deference.
Although findings of fact would not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous (as discussed above herein), sufficiency
of the evidence is a question of law, subject to review as
such by an appellate court.

Howard v. Burlington, 399 Mass.

585, 506 N.E.2d 102 (1987).

In this case, then, the

appellate court should review and determine the propriety of
the trial court's conclusions of law, as well as review the
sufficiency of the record and evidence as a whole, without
benefit of any special deference or presumption in favor of
the Whites.
Ill
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS, AND ITS CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW ARE INCORRECT, REQUIRING REVERSAL
ON APPEAL.
As indicated in lines 7 through 22, page 994 of the
Transcript, and by the Court's "Finding of Fact No. 13", the
trial court found that Morgan had paid himself $3,007 "at
the time the Hoths were to be paid", in January, 1987, plus
$2,000 to m eames at such time, and that had those amounts
been paid to the framing subcontractors, no lien would have
been filed and "he [Morgan] would never be in this lawsuit
today", and this suit would have been unnecessary.
-6-

Moreover, the trial court continued, Morgan's failure to
make such a payment to the framing subcontractor for the
balance of their contract constituted a breach of contract
between Morgan and Whites.
As discussed in the Appellants' Brief, there was no
testimony or evidence that Morgan's failure to pay Hoths in
January of 1987 would constitute a breach of his contract
with Whites.

The agreement between Whites and Morgan itself

does not support such a conclusion where Whites directly
paid Morgan certain funds for construction costs, and
indeed all of those monies (as shown by the record and
discussed in the Appellants' Brief) were paid over by Morgan
to meet construction creditors' claims, which if left
unpaid would have permitted multiple mechanic's liens to
have been filed.

If Morgan had paid Hoths in January of

1987, before the framing subcontract was completed, it would
likely have compromised the owner's claims for offset, and
suit would still have to be brought to recover them.
Moreover, as indicated by paragraphs 10 and 11 of Whites'
counterclaim, it was the owner's contention that the framing
subcontractors were not to have been paid any more money
until permanent financing had been obtained by Whites for
the property.
When the trial court ignored the detailed accounting
testimony given by Morgan on the last day of trial,
accounting for all monies paid to him on this project and
-7-

clearly showing their application to legitimate construction
costs; and when the court determined that no other liens
would have been filed and that this litigation would have
been rendered unnecessary by Morgan's payment to Hoths in
January of 1987 (instead of paying the other claims whicft
Morgan testified to have paid with those funds at that
time), the trikl court engaged in pure illogical supposition
without any factual basis or relevancy in these
proceedings.

Consequently, its findings are not supported

by the clear weight of the evidence, and are reversible as
clearly erroneous.
Similarly, after learning of this appeal, the trial
court's modification of its findings to specifically find
the existence of a partnership or joint venture? and its
conclusion that Morgan had a duty to keep the property lienfree after he could no longer control the finances or labor
performed on the project; and the conclusion that the
general contractor should indemnify the owners for the
balance of the undisputed framing subcontract, as well as
for extras performed per agreement between the owners and
the subcontractors without his involvement (especially where
the court has already given the owners the benefit of their
claims against the subcontractor by offset); plus awarding
the owners indemnity for all attorney fees in this matter,
are conclusions of law which are blatantly incorrect, and
which are reviewable for accuracy by this Court with no
-8-

special deference being accorded thereto.

The specific

nature of the errors committed by the trial court in its
findings of fact and conclusions of law are more
specifically set forth and documented in the Appellants'
Brief herein, and should be reviewed in the context of the
correct appellate standard for review, depending upon
whether the error occurred as a finding of fact, or as a
conclusion of law, as those appellate standards of review
are set forth hereinabove.
Finally, pursuant to Rule 15(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, Morgan moved to amend his pleadings to conform to
the evidence tried in this proceeding, and to clearly state
his counterclaim for out-of-pocket losses and fees.
Although the court granted the motion over White's
objection, Whites have not appealed with respect thereto,
except by oblique reference in Respondents1 Brief, page 3.
Failure by the trial court to make any findings or
conclusions whatsoever with respect to such counterclaim
also constitutes reversible error with respect to which this
Court is respectfully requested to enter findings and
conclusions in accordance with the law, or remand the case
on such issues for appropriate determination.
CONCLUSION
Contrary to the position taken by the Whites in the
Respondents' Brief, wherein it is asserted that the trial
court's findings will not be disturbed unless there is no
-9-

record of evidence to support them, viewed in a light most
favorable to the trial court's ruling, the recent decisions
of the Utah Supreme Court clearly indicate a different
standard of review should be applied upon appeal•

The

correct standard to review the trial court's findings of
fact is one in which, although there is evidences to support
the trial court, the reviewing court on the entire evidence
is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed.
With respect to the conclusions of law determined by
the trial court, a separate and distinct standard of review
is applicable.

The Utah Supreme Court in its recent

decision has defined that standard to be one in which this
Court must simply review the correctness of the trial
court's conclusions of law, without any special deference or
presumption of accuracy.

In this case, as a matter of law,

there is not sufficient evidence to support the trial
court's findings to which Appellants have taken exception;
nor are the trial court's conclusions of law correct, to the
extent that Appellants have appealed therefrom.

Regardless

of who the general contractor is, the court's conclusion
that the general contractor should be responsible to pay the
framing subcontractor the balance of the framing subcontract
(essentially allowing the owners to obtain the benefit
thereof for free, to that extent), and its further
conclusion of law that the contractor should be responsible
-10-

for the costs of extra work performed by the framing
subcontractor at the request of the owner, are clearly
incorrect conclusions of law which should be reversed.
Similarly, it is improper for the trial court to require, as
a matter of law, that the contractor should be required to
pay all of the attorneys' fees in this matter, particularly
where most of the trial time and expense related to the
resolution of the controversy between the subcontractor and
the owners over the additional work performed by the
subcontractor, and the asserted offsets by the owners.
Failure to make any findings of fact or conclusions of
law with respect to Morgan's counterclaim also constitutes
reversible error.

This Honorable Court should, sua sponte

or on remand, provide for appropriate determinations to be
made with respect to said counterclaim.
Dated this

/7

day of January, 1989.
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN

DALE G. SILER
Attorney for Third-Party
Defendants and Appellants
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